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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-3581 
____________ 
 
CARL OSBOURNE WISE, 
 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cv-00968) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 16, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Carl Osbourne Wise appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of 
the Commissioner of Social Security affirming the Commissioner’s denial of Wise’s 
disability benefits. We will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
In January 2012, Wise applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 
and Supplemental Security Income. The basis for Wise’s applications was an alleged 
inability to work beginning September 6, 2011, due to various physical ailments as well 
as depression, anxiety, and insomnia. Wise’s applications were initially denied, so he 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Following a hearing, the 
ALJ concluded that Wise was not disabled because Wise had the residual functional 
capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of sedentary work for which there were a significant 
number of jobs available in the economy. The Appeals Council denied Wise’s request for 
review of the ALJ’s decision, making it the Commissioner’s final decision.  
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Wise appealed to the District Court, and the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Commissioner, concluding that the ALJ’s findings were 
supported by substantial evidence. Wise timely appealed.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
Commissioner’s legal conclusions and review the Commissioner’s factual findings for 
substantial evidence, “which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”1 In reviewing the evidence, we may not re-weigh 
the evidence or substitute our view for the Commissioner’s.2  
III. 
The core issue on appeal is whether the ALJ erred at step five of the Social 
Security Administration’s five-step process3 in concluding that Wise was capable of 
                                              
1 Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
2 See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). 
3 The five-step process requires the ALJ to review: 
 
(1) the claimant’s current work activity; (2) the medical severity and duration of 
the claimant’s impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal 
the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the 
claimant has the residual functional capacity to return to past relevant work; and 
(5) if the claimant cannot return to past relevant work, whether he or she can make 
an adjustment to other work in the national economy.  
 
 4 
 
performing other jobs available in the national economy given his RFC. An individual’s 
RFC “is defined as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations 
caused by his or her impairment(s).”4 In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must 
consider all the evidence in the record, including the medical and non-medical evidence, 
and the ALJ must explain his rejection of any pertinent evidence. An ALJ faced with 
conflicting medical opinions may choose to credit one over another as long as the ALJ 
gives a permissible reason for rejecting a medical opinion.5 Provided that the RFC 
determination must be supported by substantial evidence, the decision is for the ALJ to 
make, not the treating physicians or State agents.6  
The ALJ concluded that Wise had the RFC to perform a range of sedentary work, 
which, in addition to physical limitations not challenged on appeal, was “limited to 
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks requiring no more than occasional interaction with 
supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.”7 Wise contends that the ALJ’s RFC 
findings as to his mental limitations are inconsistent with the medical evidence showing 
that Wise could not handle changes in a routine work setting. For support, Wise relies on 
the opinion of Dr. Thomas Andrews, the State agency examining psychologist, who in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). At steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant; at step five, 
the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. 
4 Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
5 Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2009). 
6 Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361.  
7 App. 59. 
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checkbox form accompanying his examination report opined that Wise was markedly 
limited in his ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting 
and to changes in a routine work setting. Wise also cites the opinion of Dr. John Rohar, 
the State agency reviewing psychologist (who did not personally examine Wise), stating 
that Wise could “perform simple, routine, repetitive work in a stable environment.”8 Wise 
contends that, by leaving out a limitation in Wise’s RFC about adapting to changes in the 
work setting, the ALJ wrongfully elevated his own assessment of the medical evidence 
above the assessment of the psychologists. We disagree.   
In his explanation of his RFC findings, the ALJ expressly considered the opinions 
of Dr. Andrews and Dr. Rohar. Notably, and contrary to Wise’s assertions on appeal, Dr. 
Andrews’s and Dr. Rohar’s opinions were not unanimous. Dr. Rohar criticized Dr. 
Andrews’s assessment “as an overestimate of the severity” of Wise’s limitations, 
particularly the assessment of Wise’s inability to “mak[e] performance adjustments and 
mak[e] personal and social adjustments.”9 Dr. Rohar explained that Dr. Andrews’s 
opinion should be discounted because it was “based on a brief clinical encounter” and 
relied too heavily on Wise’s “subjective report of symptoms and limitations.”10 Dr. Rohar 
                                              
8 App. 179. 
9 App. 180. 
10 Id. 
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found that Wise’s impairments did not prevent him “from performing the basic mental 
demands of competitive work on a sustained basis.”11 
The ALJ assigned Dr. Andrews’s opinion only “some weight,” rejecting his 
conclusory opinion about Wise’s inability to handle changes or pressures in a routine 
work setting because it was “based solely upon the subjective complaints of the 
claimant.”12 The ALJ found that Dr. Andrews’s opinion was not supported by the 
objective evidence, which included evidence showing that medication appeared to 
successfully treat Wise’s mental health conditions; that his primary issues were social 
stressors; and that he was consistently alert, fully oriented, well-groomed, cooperative, 
and calm with normal speech, goal-directed thought processes, intact memory, and fair 
judgment. In discussing Wise’s subjective complaints, the ALJ also found Wise lacked 
credibility, in significant part because Wise’s independent and varied daily living 
activities belied his claims of an inability to handle work-related activities. We conclude 
that Dr. Rohar’s direct criticism of Dr. Andrews’s opinion and the ALJ’s discussion of 
the evidence in the record that implicitly supported Dr. Rohar’s criticism provided a 
reasonable basis for the ALJ not to include a limitation in the RFC about Wise’s inability 
to adapt to normal work pressures or changes.  
Other aspects of Dr. Rohar’s opinion do not compel inclusion of a limitation in the 
RFC on Wise’s ability to adapt to changes in a routine work setting. In response to a 
                                              
11 Id. 
12 App. 62.  
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question on the RFC assessment about Wise’s ability to respond to changes in the work 
setting, Dr. Rohar wrote Wise was “moderately limited.”13 But we have said that ALJs 
are not required to give any weight to these fill-in-the-blank and checklist portions of 
RFC assessments and that their focus instead should be on the narrative portions of the 
assessments where the medical experts expound on their opinions.14 Dr. Rohar’s ultimate 
RFC conclusion—that Wise’s limitations did not prevent him from performing the basic 
mental demands of competitive work on a sustained basis—does not require a limitation 
about adapting to changes in a routine work setting and is therefore consistent with the 
ALJ’s RFC findings omitting any such limitation. Still, the ALJ assigned Dr. Rohar’s 
opinion “some weight,” giving Wise “the benefit of the doubt” by further limiting Wise’s 
contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.15  
Wise correctly notes Dr. Rohar’s opinion that Wise should be limited to “simple, 
routine, repetitive work in a stable environment,” but Wise overstates Dr. Rohar’s use of 
the word “stable.” Nothing in the ALJ’s RFC analysis indicates that he understood Dr. 
Rohar’s recommendation of a “stable environment” to refer to a limitation on Wise’s 
ability to adapt to changes in the work setting. In fact, Dr. Rohar used the word “stable” 
to describe Wise’s concentration and persistence limitations and addressed Wise’s 
                                              
13 App. 180. 
14 See Smith, 631 F.3d at 636; see also App. 179 (“The questions below help 
determine the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities. However, the 
actual mental residual functional capacity assessment is recorded in the narrative 
discussion(s) in the explanation text boxes.”). 
15 App. 62. 
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adaptation limitations, including his ability to adapt to changes in the work setting, 
elsewhere on the RFC assessment form. Additionally, Dr. Rohar’s assessment that Wise 
should be limited to “production oriented jobs requiring little independent decision 
making”16 was accounted for in the ALJ’s RFC findings limiting Wise to simple, routine, 
and repetitive tasks with no more than occasional interaction with any other people. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the vocational expert’s testimony that a person with Wise’s 
RFC could perform the production-oriented jobs of document preparer and ampoule 
sealer.  
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC 
findings, and that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert conveyed all of Wise’s 
credibly established limitations. Finally, because the ALJ credited the vocational expert’s 
opinion that there were substantial jobs available in the national economy for someone 
with Wise’s RFC, the ALJ’s finding that Wise was not disabled is supported by 
substantial evidence.   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
16 App. 180. 
